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INTRODUCTION
“The task is to identify a mode of analysis that allows Congress to
regulate more than nothing . . . and less than everything . . . .”1 Justice
O’Connor’s succinct summary of the nature of the commerce power
recognizes its seeming simplicity and the underlying difficulties of
determining the appropriate balance between the power of the federal
government to effectively regulate and the sovereignty of the states. This
problem is compounded when the courts face controversial issues, such
as child pornography, because as citizens we want our government to be
powerful enough to catch and prosecute pedophiles who threaten our
children, while we want also to be free of an overly-encroaching
government. The United States circuit courts have discussed this issue in
many cases, resulting in a split among the courts of appeals as to whether
the federal government’s regulation of child pornography is a
constitutional exercise of the commerce power or invades the sphere
traditionally controlled by the states.2 This comment explores judicial
treatment of the Federal Child Pornography statutes, specifically 18
U.S.C. § 2251(a) and § 2252(a)(4)(B), which regulate the production and
possession of child pornography.
Part One offers a brief history of the relevant Supreme Court
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and explains the legislative history of
the child pornography statutes and their multiple amendments over the
years. Part Two introduces the circuit split, briefly explains
representative cases from each side of the debate, and analyzes the
decisions. Part Three discusses Gonzales v. Raich,3 the recent Supreme
Court case which dealt with Congress’s use of the Commerce Clause in
regulating medicinal marijuana. Part Three also discusses the Court’s
subsequent vacation of United States v. Smith4 and United States v.
Maxwell,5 two Eleventh Circuit decisions declaring the child
pornography statutes unconstitutional. Finally, Part Three discusses how
the circuit courts have interpreted Raich. Part Four analyzes the circuit
split in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Raich, the relative
strengths and weaknesses of each side, and discusses the constitutionality
of the statutes. Part Five concludes the comment and discusses the future
of the Child Pornography statutes and the Commerce Clause.

1
2
3
4
5

Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2223 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
See infra Part II.
125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
402 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2005).
386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004).
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I. HISTORY OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LEGISLATION
A. Brief History of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the power
“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes.”6 The Commerce Clause has often
been the subject of heated litigation, and the Court’s interpretation of it
has been inconsistent.
While an exhaustive history of the Commerce Clause is outside of
the scope of this comment, a discussion of certain seminal cases in
Commerce Clause jurisprudence is required to put the issue in context. In
addition, special attention is paid to Wickard v. Filburn,7 United States v.
Lopez,8 and United States v. Morrison.9
One of the earliest cases in which the Supreme Court addressed the
scope of the Commerce Clause was Gibbons v. Ogden.10 In Gibbons, a
New York law gave a steamboat operation monopoly to two men, who in
turn licensed Ogden to run a ferry company.11 Gibbons, who ran a rival
ferry company, violated this law by competing with Ogden.12 Gibbons,
however, claimed that his federal ferry license pre-empted New York’s
law.13 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall,
determined that the federal law did in fact pre-empt New York law and
that the federal law was constitutional under the Commerce Clause,
holding that “the opinion is unequivocally manifested that Congress may
control the State laws, so far as it may be necessary to control them, for
the regulation of commerce.”14 Therefore, most commentators have
interpreted Gibbons to stand for the proposition that “Congress has
complete authority to regulate all commerce among the States.”15
After this decision, the Court slowly began to retract the broad
power it had given to Congress. In 1869, the Court overturned a federal
law passed under the Commerce Clause for the first time in United States
v. Dewitt.16 That case, involving a federal ban of certain illuminating oils,
6

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
8
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
9
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10
22 U.S. 1 (1824).
11
Id. at 1.
12
Id. at 1-2.
13
Id. at 2.
14
Id. at 206.
15
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
Ed. 2002).
16
76 U.S. 41 (1869).
7

AND

POLICIES 241 (2d
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found that issues of internal trade among the states were not proper
exercises of the commerce power.17 Between 1870 and 1937 the
Commerce Clause was litigated numerous times. For example, United
States v. E.C. Knight18 struck down the use of the Sherman Antitrust Act
to regulate sugar manufacturing because manufacture was considered a
separate activity from commerce.19 However, the Shreveport Rate
Cases20 upheld the Interstate Commerce Act’s ability to set railroad rates
because they directly affected interstate commerce—drawing a
distinction between direct and indirect effects.21
In 1937, amid the pressure of the Great Depression and President
Roosevelt’s court-packing scheme, the Court abruptly reversed its
decades long history of limiting the commerce power. The Court began
this reversal in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.22 which centered
on the National Labor Relations Act (“the Act”). The Act, among other
things, granted collective bargaining power to labor employees.23 The
Court upheld the act, finding a strong relationship between labor and
commerce. Chief Justice Hughes reasoned that:
[t]he fundamental principle is that the power to regulate
commerce is the power to enact ‘all appropriate legislation’ for
‘its protection and advancement,’ ‘to adopt measures’ to
‘promote its growth and insure its safety,’ ‘to foster, protect,
control, and restrain.’ That power is plenary and may be exerted
to protect interstate commerce no matter what the source of the
dangers which threaten it.24

During this era, the Court also decided Wickard v. Filburn.25 In
Wickard, a wheat farmer was charged with violating the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938 (“AAA”)26 for exceeding his acreage allotment
provided by the statute.27 Filburn, the farmer, argued that since he used
17

Id. The Court held that “[b]ut this express grant of power to regulate commerce
among the States has always been understood as limited by its terms; and as a virtual
denial of any power to interfere with the internal trade and business of the separate
States.” Id. at 43-44.
18
156 U.S. 1 (1895).
19
Id.
20
Houston, E. and W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
21
Id. Other important cases of the era include Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918), Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935), and
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
22
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
23
Id. at 22-25.
24
Id. at 37.
25
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
26
7 U.S.C. § 1281 (1938).
27
317 U.S. at 114-15.
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his wheat only for home consumption, his use did not affect interstate
commerce and the act was unconstitutional as applied to him. 28 The
Court determined, however, that the act was constitutional and that
Filburn’s wholly intrastate activity was within the scope of congressional
authority.29 The Court explained that “the reach of that power extends to
those intrastate activities which in a substantial way interfere with or
obstruct the exercise of the granted power.”30 Thus, the Court followed a
theory in which the de minimus activities of an individual, engaged
solely in intrastate use, could readily be regulated by the Commerce
Clause for its aggregate effect on interstate commerce.
Between 1942 and 1995, few people disputed Congress’s ability to
regulate under the Commerce Clause. During this time, the courts
applied a rational basis test.31 This test allowed Congress to regulate
anything that had any rationally conceived relationship to commerce. For
example, in Hodel v. Indiana, the Court declared that “[a] court may
invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is
clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional finding that the
regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is no
reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the
asserted ends.”32
The Supreme Court continued to defer to Congress’s expansive use
of the Commerce Clause until 1995 when United States v. Lopez33 was
decided. In Lopez, a high school student was charged with carrying a gun
to school, in contravention of the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990.34
The Court, reversing its decades-old deference, found that the Act
exceeded Congress’s commerce power because it “upsets the federal
balance to a degree that renders it an unconstitutional assertion of the
commerce power.”35
Reviewing prior cases, the Lopez Court explained that Congress can
regulate three types of activities: (1) channels of interstate commerce, (2)
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and (3) activities having a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.36 The Court quickly

28

Id. at 118.
Id. at 128-29.
30
Id. at 124 (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119
(1942)).
31
See Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 253.
32
452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981).
33
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
34
Id.
35
Id. at 580.
36
Id. at 558-59.
29
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determined that the Act did not fall under categories one or two.37 Chief
Justice Rehnquist then analyzed the Act under category three and
declared that “[t]he possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no
sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere,
substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.”38 Thus, the Court
laid the foundation for a stricter interpretation of the Commerce Clause,
demanding a more serious look at the nature of the activity to be
regulated.
Finally, in United States v. Morrison,39 a female student at Virginia
Polytechnic Institute claimed she was raped and sued her assailants under
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994.40 The Court elaborated upon
Lopez and articulated four factors that were useful in analyzing category
three: they were (1) if the statute regulates commerce or is an economic
activity; (2) whether the statute has an express jurisdictional element;41
(3) whether congressional findings support the belief that the activity has
a substantial effect on commerce; and (4) if the offense has an attenuated
relationship to that substantial effect on interstate commerce.42 The
Court, relying on these factors, “reject[ed] the argument that Congress
may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that
conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce,” and found the
VAWA unconstitutional. 43
Through Lopez and Morrison, the Court diluted Congress’s
Commerce Clause power. In doing so, the Supreme Court protected the
constitutionally drawn boundaries between the states’ police power and
the federal government’s ability to regulate interstate commerce. The
above decisions emphasized the Federalist belief that the prosecutions of
criminals are a state matter, not a federal matter. However, this did not
compel Congress to stop trying to pass laws pursuant to its power under
the Commerce Clause. In fact, Congress has tried harder.
B. The Federal Child Pornography Statutes
Before discussing the circuit decisions, it is important to understand
the language and context of the child pornography statutes. Section

37

Id. at 559.
Id. at 567.
39
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
40
Id. at 601-603.
41
A jurisdictional element is a clause in an act that limits the reach of that statute, to
ensure that each violation of the act is actually substantially related to interstate
commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-12.
42
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-12.
43
Id. at 617.
38

2006]

Raich and the Federal Child Pornography Statutes

627

2251(a) of the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of
1977 states that:
Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or
coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any
other person to engage in, or who transports any minor in
interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession
of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in,
any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any
visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished as provided
under subsection (e), if such person knows or has reason to know
that such visual depiction will be transported in interstate or
foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was
produced using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means,
including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually
been transported in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed.44

The Act, as it is currently written, regulates the production of child
pornography if the producer either knew or had reason to know that the
pornography was made using any materials that moved through interstate
commerce at any point in time. The original version of the Act in 1977,
however, required that the pornography itself be transported in interstate
commerce, which was substantially more difficult to prosecute.45 At its
original passage, Congress supported the statute with extensive
legislative findings, stating that child pornography is a “highly
organized, multimillion dollar industry that operates on a nationwide
scale.”46
Congress amended the Act in 1984, renaming it the Child
Protection Act of 1984.47 The amended Act eliminated the previously
required provision that the child pornography be produced or distributed
for “pecuniary profit,” because Congress was concerned with the
inability to prosecute pornographers who make and distribute
pornography “without any commercial motive.”48 Despite this removal
of any commercial intent requirement, the Act was still founded in the
Commerce Clause. In 1986 Congress passed the Child Abuse Victim’s
Rights Act, which further amended the Act to include new civil
remedies.49 In the following years, Congress made four more minor
44

18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
See United States v. Morales-De Jesus, 372 F.3d 6, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2004).
46
SEN. REP. NO. 95-438, at 5 (1977).
47
See Morales-De Jesus, 372 F.3d at 11 (citing the Child Protection Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204; H.R. REP. NO. 98-536 at 10 (1993)).
48
Id.
49
Id.
45
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amendments, in 1988, 1990, 1994, and 1996.50 The most relevant
amendment came in 1998, when Congress changed the jurisdictional
element to include the “materials-in-commerce” provision, so that only
the materials used to create the pornography need ever travel through
interstate commerce in order to be regulated.51 Congress offered two
justifications for this amendment. The first was to make § 2251(a) mirror
its sister statute, § 2252(a)(4)(B) (“the Possession Statute”).52 Second,
Congress wanted to reach a larger number of child pornographers, who
slipped through the cracks of the older statute.53
The parallel possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) states
that:
Any person who . . . knowingly possesses 1 or more books,
magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter which
contain any visual depiction that has been mailed, or has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or
which was produced using materials which have been mailed or
so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer,
if—(i) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of
a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct; shall be punished as
provided in subsection (b) of this section.54

This statute also merely requires that the production materials move
through interstate commerce for the jurisdictional element to be met.
Therefore, the two sections have nearly identical jurisdictional elements.
Both are extremely broad and enable the federal government to prosecute
wholly intrastate child pornography, since almost all commercial
products are shipped across state lines at some point.
The Possession Statute has no independent congressional findings
or amendments, but because the statutes are so similarly worded and are
located within the same statutory framework, it is likely that the findings
were intended to apply to both sections. Moreover, some circuit
decisions, in discussing the Possession Statute cite to those congressional
findings, lending additional support for this contention.55 From this, it is
safe to assume that these statutes were intended to be paired as the
50

18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).
See Morales-De Jesus, 372 F.3d at 11.
52
Id. at 11-12.
53
Id.
54
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
55
See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 137 F.3d 652, 656 (1st Cir. 1998). Also, the
court in Morales-De Jesus found the statutes to be “analogous.” 372 F.3d at 15. The
court in United States v. Holston described them as “nearly identical” and “equivalent.”
343 F.3d 83, 89 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003).
51
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production and possession elements of one over-arching child
pornography statute. Therefore, when scrutinizing the cases below, the
two sections will be considered the same for purposes of the analysis.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The history of the commerce power demonstrates the confusion
Congress faces as it attempts to exert its power within constitutional
bounds. Many recent decisions, such as Lopez, have declared Wickard to
be “the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority”56 and
obviously the trend after Lopez and Morrison was to be much more
conservative with the commerce power. Under Wickard, nearly any
activity that is even remotely economic is within the scope. However,
neither Lopez nor Morrison overruled Wickard. Instead, the Rehnquist
Court attempted to synthesize them by using the Lopez categories and
Morrison factors to weaken Wickard without expressly overruling it.
A. Circuits that Upheld the Child Pornography Statutes as Constitutional
Because of this uncertainty, it is no surprise that a judicial
consensus has not emerged regarding the constitutionality of the federal
Child Pornography Statutes. Some courts have upheld the statutes in
their entirety. Others have struck them down. And still others have
upheld the statutes, but conveyed a sense of uncertainty in this decision.
Because child pornography is neither an instrumentality nor a channel of
interstate commerce, the only way these statutes could be considered
constitutional is through the third Lopez category—activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.57
The First Circuit has examined the statutes twice, looking first at
the Possession Statute in United States v. Robinson58 and then at the
Production Statute in United States v. Morales-De Jesus.59 In Robinson,
the court reviewed the conviction of Gilbert Robinson, who was found in
possession of fifty sexually explicit photographs of teenage boys.60 The
statute applied, since Robinson freely admitted using Kodak film and
cameras to take the pictures, both of which were manufactured outside
his home state of Massachusetts.61

56
57
58
59
60
61

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 137 F.3d 652, 656 (1st Cir. 1998).
137 F.3d 652 (1st Cir. 1998).
372 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2004).
See Robinson, 137 F.3d at 653.
Id.
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Robinson challenged his conviction based on Lopez only, as
Morrison had not yet been litigated.62 The court found that Robinson’s
conduct fell within the third category, holding that localized child
pornography could rationally be considered an activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce. It therefore upheld the statute.63 In doing so,
the court relied heavily on the “explicit jurisdictional element,” which
limits the reach of the statute to pornography produced with materials
that had been transported in interstate commerce. The jurisdictional
element saved the statute, the court held, because it “requires an answer
on a case-by-case basis.” 64
The First Circuit reviewed Robinson, post-Morrison, in United
States v. Morales-De Jesus.65 Elvin Tomas Morales-De Jesus was
convicted under the Production Statute for seducing his thirteen year old
god-daughter on at least five separate occasions, and videotaping two of
them.66 In his facial and as-applied challenges, Morales-De Jesus claimed
that under both Lopez and Morrison, the Production Statute was an
unconstitutional exercise of the commerce power.67
The court applied the four Morrison factors and found that
Congress supported the acts with clear legislative findings that child
pornography was “a highly organized, multimillion dollar industry that
operates on a nationwide scale.”68 The court also defined child
pornography as commercial because “there are large markets for child
pornography . . . ‘[t]here can be no doubt that the production of visual
depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct, i.e., child
pornography is economic in nature.’”69
The First Circuit was less confident in the jurisdictional element
than it had been in Robinson. Citing the Third Circuit decision of United
States v. Rodia,70 the court found that “as a practical matter, the limiting
jurisdictional factor is almost useless here”71 and feared that the
materials-in-commerce jurisdictional hook “has the kind of flaw so
worrisome” that it should not be upheld.

62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Id. at 655.
Id. at 656.
Id.
372 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2004).
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 10 (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 5 (1977)).
Id. at 12 (quoting United States v. Buculei, 262 F.3d 322, 329 (4th Cir. 2001)).
194 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 1999).
372 F.3d at 13 (quoting Rodia, 194 F.3d at 473).
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However, after analyzing the fourth Morrison factor, the link
between the activity and interstate commerce, the court upheld the
statute.73 The court concluded that “producing child pornography is an
economic activity because it creates a product for which there is an
extensive national market.”74 In addition, “a significant portion of the
child pornography about which Congress is concerned ‘is homegrown,
untraceable, and enters the national market surreptitiously.”75
The First Circuit then analyzed Morales-De Jesus’s as-applied
claim that his individual production of child pornography for his own use
was outside the scope of the commerce clause.76 The court quickly
rejected this argument, finding that “[t]his claim fails because Congress’s
power to criminalize this conduct pursuant to the Commerce Clause turns
on the economic nature of the class of conduct defined in the statute
rather than the economic facts (such as sale or distribution) of a single
case.”77 Therefore, the court, relying more on Wickard’s aggregation
principle than on the Rehnquist Court’s recent preference for a limited
commerce power, upheld both provisions of the child pornography
statutes.
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Holston,78 also found the
Production Statute to be constitutional. In that case, Eric Holston was
convicted of producing several videotapes of his neighbor’s young
children engaged in various sexual activities.79 The materials used to
make the videos were manufactured in Japan.80 The court, like the First
Circuit, applied the Morrison factors and questioned the validity of the
jurisdictional element, finding it only “superficially met.”81 Despite the
weakness of the jurisdictional element, the Second Circuit ruled that it
was “not determinative” because the other Morrison factors were
satisfied.82 Finally, in looking at Holston’s as-applied challenge, the
court quickly established that his “de minimus” activity was covered
because of the aggregation principle. Since child pornography in general
was commercial in nature, the character of Holston’s own use was
irrelevant. 83
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Id. at 14.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
343 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 84.
Id.
Id. at 89.
Id.
Id. at 91.
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In United States v. Rodia,84 the Third Circuit aligned with the prior
circuits and upheld Joseph Rodia’s conviction under the possession
statute for having Polaroid pictures of a young child.85 The court found
dispositive the fact that the Polaroid film was manufactured outside of
New Jersey, where Rodia lived.86 Unlike the First and Second Circuits,
the Third Circuit expressed “misgivings” about its decision but
nonetheless found in favor of the government.87
The Rodia court clearly found the statute’s jurisdictional element to
be weak at best, stating that “it is at least doubtful in this case that the
jurisdictional element adequately performs the function of guaranteeing
that the final product regulated substantially affects interstate
commerce.”88 However, the court also concluded that “[t]here is no
dispute” that child pornography is a commercial activity89 and reasoned
that:
Some pornographers manufacture, possess, and use child
pornography exclusively within the boundaries of a state, and
often only within the boundaries of their own property. It is
unrealistic to think that those pornographers will be content with
their own supply, hence they will likely wish to explore new or
additional pornographic photographs of children . . . . Therefore
the possession of ‘homegrown’ pornography may well stimulate
a further interest in pornography that immediately or eventually
animates demand for interstate pornography.90

The Third Circuit, in essence, articulated an “addiction theory.” The
court used this theory as justification that Congress could reasonably
have believed that the possession of homemade child pornography, while
not necessarily affecting interstate commerce, would likely create a
desire for the pornographer to enter the national market for child
pornography. Therefore, intrastate child pornography is a gateway into
the commercial market. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on a
Senate Report which stated that “[p]ornography ‘is an addiction that
escalates, requiring more graphic or violent material for arousal . . .
thereby increasing the creation and distribution of child pornography.’”91

84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

194 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 469.
Id.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 473.
Id. at 474.
Rodia, 194 F.3d at 477.
Id. at 478 (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-358 at 13 (1996)).
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The court then applied this addiction principle to limit the statute’s
enforcement. The court explained that the close link between homemade
pornography and the desire for more “provides a limiting principle of the
type sought in Lopez.”92 That nexus made this statute different from
unconstitutional ones such as “criminal regulations that attempt to limit
or ban behavior that does not involve an exchange of goods, such as
murder or assault.”93
The Third Circuit concluded by asserting that Congress was
“effectively entitled to regulate any intrastate activity involving a good
when there is a larger interstate market for it.”94 Because child
pornography does have an interstate market and because it is a fungible
product that “cannot be effectively regulated without federal control over
both the interstate and local versions of the activity” this statute was
distinguishable from the ones struck down in Lopez and Morrison.95 So,
despite the fact that the Third Circuit was “troubled by the lack of
express congressional findings about the effect of intrastate possession of
child pornography on interstate commerce,”96 the court upheld the
statute.
The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Buculei97 considered the
constitutionality of the statute where there was obvious interstate
activity. Catalin Buculei, from New York, met a thirteen year old girl
living in Maryland online and convinced her to meet him.98 Buculei took
the girl to a motel where he gave her a drink and raped her.99 He
attempted to tape the encounter, but failed to rewind his tape enough.100
The Fourth Circuit, basing its opinion on Lopez and Morrison, found the
statute to be constitutional. “[T]his case is distinguishable from Lopez
and Morrison” the court held, because those cases involved the attempt
to regulate activities that would themselves affect another market while
the statute at issue attempted to regulate the product itself.101 Unlike the
first three circuits, the Fourth Circuit found the jurisdictional element to
be perfectly valid because it limited jurisdiction to “a discrete set of

92

Id. at 479.
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 482.
97
262 F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 2001).
98
Id.
99
Id. at 325-26.
100
Id. at 325 & 328 n.5.
101
Id. at 330. Lopez and Morrison attempted to regulate activities related to the
statute, such as regulating gun possession near school, rather than gun possession itself,
whereas this statute regulates the product of child pornography itself.
93
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activities,”102 rather than functioning merely as lip-service to the decision
in Lopez, as the other circuits seemed to interpret it.
The Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have found at least
one of the two child pornography statutes constitutional under the
Commerce Clause. The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Kallestad,103
found that because “it may often be impossible to determine whether a
specific piece of child pornography has moved in interstate commerce”
Congress could use its commerce power to regulate all child
pornography, not just that which is definitively commercial.104
In United States v. Angle,105 the Seventh Circuit upheld Ralph
Angle’s conviction for possessing fourteen diskettes that had been erased
but still contained recoverable images of child pornography, despite
Angle’s contention that he neither knew that the images were recoverable
nor how to go about recovering them.106 The court decided that, in the
aggregate, local child pornography substantially affects interstate
commerce and that Angle’s own use was immaterial to that decision.107
The Eighth Circuit in two decisions, one pre- and one postMorrison, also upheld the statutes as constitutional. The court, in United
States v. Bausch108 found that a man using a Japanese camera to
photograph two teenage girls was within the reach of the Possession
Statute based on the express jurisdictional element as required by
Lopez.109 In United States v. Hoggard,110 the defendant was arrested for
possessing photographs of his wife engaged in sexual activity with their
young children.111 The case, despite being decided after Morrison did not
consider any of the factors set out by the Supreme Court and based the
holding solely on its jurisdictional element and its prior decision in
Bausch.112
Finally, the Tenth Circuit considered the constitutionality of the
Possession Statute in United States v. Riccardi.113 In this as-applied
challenge, the court used the Morrison factors and discussed the circuit
split on the issue.114 In determining that this case was distinguishable
102
103
104
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from those in which the statute was struck down, the court looked at the
facts of the case and found Riccardi’s own activity to be economic
because he paid the children he photographed.115 The court also found his
activities to be interstate in nature because he transported the boys across
state lines on a few occasions.116 Although the court ultimately upheld
the statute, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the facts of the case itself in
making that determination, despite the fact that most other circuits found
the “de minimus” actions of the particular defendant to be wholly
irrelevant.117
B. Circuits that Struck Down the Statutes
Like the Tenth Circuit, three other circuits questioned the
constitutionality of the child pornography statutes based on facts of the
particular case. Each circuit found that the as-applied challenge
contained facts that put the defendant outside the reach of the federal
government.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Corp118 is
illustrative of this point. Patrick Corp dropped off a set of film to be
developed at his local pharmacy.119 When he did, he commented to the
cashier that “these are sick” and when they were developed, the photos
contained pornographic shots of what appeared to be teenage girls.120
The police investigated and discovered that one female was a local
seventeen year old, but that the other was Corp’s twenty-six-year-old
wife, who engaged in consensual sexual activity.121 Corp was charged
under the Possession Statute because the photo paper used was
manufactured in Germany, and he was convicted by the Western District
of Michigan.122
The Sixth Circuit cited heavily from Lopez, Morrison, and the
Third Circuit’s decision in Rodia (specifically Rodia’s criticism of the
jurisdictional element) to determine that Corp’s own activity did not have
a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The court wrote that “Corp
was not involved, nor intended to be involved, in the distribution or
sharing with others of the pictures in question.”123 The court also
concluded that a seventeen-year-old woman, apparently a willing
115
116
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participant, was not an “exploited child,” and that Corp himself did not
appear to be a pedophile that was a danger to children.124 Using a factual
analysis, the Sixth Circuit differentiated between the activities Congress
intended to cover in the child pornography statutes and those of Patrick
Corp. However, the court failed to explain why it ignored the “de
minimus” character of Corp’s activity. Instead, the court simply found
that his activity did not “substantially affect interstate commerce.”125
In United States v. McCoy,126 the Ninth Circuit also focused on the
facts of the case to determine that the Possession Statute was
unconstitutional as applied to the situation.127 Rhonda McCoy and her
husband were not great parents and while preparing for Easter in 2000,
McCoy posed for semi-nude photographs with her ten year old
daughter.128 The government again based jurisdiction on the fact that the
Kodak film and Canon camera used that night were both manufactured
outside of California and transported through interstate commerce.129
Following Lopez and Morrison, the court explained that “Wickard’s
‘aggregation principle’ does not determine the question here. In both
Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court carefully limited the reach of
Wickard.”130
The Ninth Circuit then had little trouble concluding that McCoy’s
homemade pornography was “purely non-economic and noncommercial, and had no connection with or effect on any national or
international child pornography market, substantial or otherwise.”131
Going through the four Morrison factors, the court dismissed all of them,
including the congressional findings that had been so relevant in other
circuit decisions. The court wrote, reminiscent of Rodia, that “no
legislative findings exist with respect to the interstate effect of intrastate,
non-commercial possession of the prohibited materials here.” 132
The dissenting opinion, written by Judge Trott, vehemently
disagreed with the logic of the majority.133 Judge Trott reiterated the
opinions of the other circuits and commented that “. . .the Supreme Court
appears under such circumstances to have ruled out ‘as applied’
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challenges in Commerce Clause cases.”134 Judge Trott, unlike the
majority, found that McCoy’s conduct “clearly falls within the purview
of the plain language of the statute under any statutory construction of it,
including the jurisdictional element . . . . To the statute, it is immaterial
that the particular child pornography under scrutiny was not produced for
sale or trade.”135 Judge Trott’s dissent lined up exactly with the logic
employed by the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits, all of which found the individual activity wholly
irrelevant to the constitutionality of the statute.
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit issued two opinions on the child
pornography statutes in close succession. United States v. Maxwell136 and
United States v. Smith,137 both found the federal statutes unconstitutional.
Maxwell involved the Possession Statute.138 James Maxwell rented a
room from his ex-girlfriend, Wallace, and was allowed access to her
computer and the internet.139 When she grew suspicious of Maxwell’s
use of her computer, Wallace called the FBI, who then discovered
“several hundred images of child pornography.”140
The Eleventh Circuit applied the Morrison factors and posited that
the materials-in-commerce jurisdictional element was not adequate
because it did not relate to child pornography itself. The court held that
“nor does it seem that § 2252A represents a federal effort to reduce the
trafficking of cameras, computers, staples, blank paper, film, or disks in
interstate commerce.”141 With this hook, the government was able to
regulate Maxwell’s conduct when “as far [as] interstate commerce is
concerned, Maxwell has done nothing more than possess two disks that
traveled from out-of-state.”142 In applying the factors, the court
concluded that there was “no rational basis” for the federal government
to regulate Maxwell’s individual conduct and based its holding on the
weakness of the jurisdictional element, which attached to Maxwell
simply because of his use of out-of-state disks.143
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United States v, Smith,144 decided only months after Maxwell, not
surprisingly held that both the Possession and Production Statutes of the
child pornography acts were unconstitutional.145 In Smith, the Tampa
Police Department searched the defendant’s home because Smith’s
brother allegedly possessed drugs.146 The police discovered a lockbox of
Smith’s, which contained 1,768 pictures, several of them depicting
“‘very, very young girls having sex . . . with a male who [was later]
identified as the defendant.’”147 Even though Smith was convicted under
both provisions of the statute, the Eleventh Circuit applied the same
reasoning as Maxwell and concluded that “[a]s in Maxwell, ‘we believe
Morrison’s framework produces the correct result in this case.’”148 The
Eleventh Circuit in fact did not even apply a true factual analysis as it
had in Maxwell. The court relied mostly on Maxwell to determine that
almost any homemade pornography will be outside the jurisdiction of the
federal government.149
C. Analysis of Circuit Decisions
1. Circuits that Upheld the Statutes
The majority of circuits have found that the child pornography
statutes are constitutional exercises of the commerce power. This does
not mean, however, that those circuits are automatically correct. Of the
ten cases where the statutes were upheld by the various circuits, three
occurred between Lopez in 1995 and Morrison in 2000: United States v.
Robinson,150 United States v. Rodia,151 and United States v. Bausch.152 Of
course these cases were decided without the Morrison factors and, thus,
may not align with the Supreme Court’s analysis. But all three do apply
the Lopez Category Three analysis and the Court’s discussion of explicit
jurisdictional elements to determine that the Gun-Free School Zone Act
could be distinguished from the federal Child Pornography Statutes.
Despite being pre-Morrison and therefore possibly reversible on that
basis, it is not likely that these cases will be overturned for that reason.
For example, the First Circuit in Morales-De Jesus declared that
Robinson had “essentially anticipated all four of the Morrison factors”
144
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148
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150
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and was still good law.153 Furthermore, Rodia’s analysis of the
jurisdictional element has been cited with approval by several of the
post-Morrison cases.154 The cases that followed Morrison nearly all
applied its factors, to varying degrees, to find that the statutes were
constitutional.155
However, it is interesting to note that despite the circuits’ lip
service to the Court’s decisions, all of those circuits ultimately found that
the holdings of Lopez and Morrison did not require them to declare the
Production and Possession Statutes unconstitutional. If the circuits had
truly followed the messages of those decisions they likely would have
determined that the Supreme Court was drastically limiting Congress’s
power, not expanding it. It seems odd that in a period of extreme
Supreme Court deference to the states that the circuit courts would not
follow this lead.
Moreover, many of the circuits after Rodia found that the
jurisdictional element, requiring only that the raw materials used to make
the child pornography pass through commerce, was not valid because it
failed to truly limit Congress’s reach.156 There would be no basis for
those courts to uphold the statutes if they failed to satisfy the Morrison
factors, and it seems more that the circuits disregarded the weakness of
the jurisdictional element in favor of the other three factors. This is
troubling because in Lopez the lack of a jurisdictional element was a key
factor in the Court’s decision to strike down the statute.157 Even though
these statutes are different from Lopez because they did actually include
a jurisdictional element, this is merely semantics because the
jurisdictional elements at issue are negligible in their ability to rein in the
statutes’ reach.
Despite these failings, the decisions were correctly determined. The
courts, for the most part did apply the Morrison test and used it to
determine the outcome. Even if the circuits disagreed with the holdings
of the Supreme Court, they still followed the guidelines set up and were
able to determine the constitutional boundaries of the child pornography
statutes from that. As well, several of the circuits also determined
additional bases for Congress’s power—such as the Rodia158 court’s
153
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creation of the “addiction test” and the “market theory” put forth by the
Fifth Circuit.159
These circuits also apparently anticipated the shift that the Court
itself would take, in preferring the Wickard aggregation theory over
Lopez or Morrison.160 Nearly all of the circuits stated their preference for
Wickard’s strong reach to Lopez and Morrison, and found a way to
follow all three—by applying the aggregation theory as a way to
circumvent the strictness of Morrison’s factors. In choosing to follow
Wickard, the courts deferred to the long standing precedent that Congress
has a broad range of power under the Commerce Clause.
Because of this preference, “the judiciary has largely ‘declined to
read Morrison to require that earlier cases be overruled or even seriously
reexamined’”161 or even that current cases need strict adherence to the
holding of Morrison. Another commentator noted that to follow Lopez
would be tantamount to returning to the pre-New Deal era of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.162 He noted that Justice Souter commented in his
Lopez dissent that “the distinction between what is patently commercial
and what is not looks much like the old distinction between what directly
affects commerce and what touches it only indirectly.”163 It is possible
that the circuit courts recognized the artificiality of the Lopez Court’s
distinctions between things that substantially affect interstate commerce
and those which for some reason do not, and found that categorization
was unworkable.
Ultimately, in the years between Morrison and Raich, the circuit
courts were forced to determine the constitutionality of the child
pornography statutes for themselves, with little clear guidance from the
Supreme Court. “[I]t is important to keep in mind that Morrison’s four
factors do not provide a bright-line test, and an affirmative or negative
answer on any or all of the factors will not guarantee a particular
outcome.”164 Commentators have noted that “the new Commerce Clause
analysis has been haphazardly applied by the lower courts” because of
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the lack of clear guidelines.165 Because of this ambiguity, the courts were
awash with precedence tending towards broad congressional power and
the newer decisions that purported to rectify this, but left the lower courts
in greater confusion.
2. Circuits that Struck Down the Statutes
The Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits all struck down the federal
Child Pornography Statutes as applied to the cases before their courts.
Those circuits found that the statutes could not reach the insulated,
intrastate activities of child pornographers who did not share or sell their
product. The courts in general made several good points in their analysis,
especially about the weakness of the jurisdictional element, a line of
reasoning for the most part accepted by the other circuits as well. In
particular, the Maxwell court pointed out that the materials-in-commerce
hook was probably not adequately related to child pornography, and that
there was no suggestion that “Congress was concerned about the
materials used to produce pornography or how those materials would
impact interstate commerce.”166 The implication that the jurisdictional
element does not, in any practical way, limit the reach of the statutes is
valid and most other circuits have accepted this logic.
The Maxwell court made another compelling argument, namely that
the statutes at issue, especially the Possession Statute, do not prohibit
trade or sale of child pornography, but the simple possession or home
production.167 If the government was truly concerned with the interstate
market for child pornography, it seems more likely that the statutes
would be aimed at catching those people who are actively involved in
that market, not people who are simply making their own pornography,
for their own use.168 Rodia’s “addiction theory” only goes so far—a
“successful” child pornographer might never need to enter the national
market, and none of the circuit cases suggest that any of these defendants
attempted to.
Notwithstanding the legitimate claims of these circuits, there are far
more criticisms of the analyses. First, all of the circuits that struck down
the statutes did so only on an as-applied challenge, after a factual
165
Paul Tzur, Comment, I Know Economic Activity When I See Economic Activity: An
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analysis of the case. The Raich decision, as well as prior precedent
suggested that as-applied challenges are inappropriate in Commerce
Clause litigation. Judge Trott’s dissent in McCoy recognized this
problem and wrote that “it is immaterial” that the child pornography at
issue did not itself affect interstate commerce, so long as it was within
the class of child pornography which, in the aggregate, does have such an
effect.169 Despite the majority’s contention that wholly intrastate child
pornography was a separate and distinct class of activities, commentators
have noted that “both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits in Corp and McCoy
attempted to restrict their findings to the de minimus facts of a particular
case.”170
But, as Lopez demonstrated, this question is entirely irrelevant
for determining the constitutionality of a commerce-based
statute. Asking whether the defendant did anything prohibited by
the statute is not a constitutional question. Answering that
question is necessary, of course, for sustaining a conviction and
applying the weight of the law to the claimant; but mounting a
constitutional challenge to a Commerce Clause statute first
requires the court to determine ‘whether the class is within the
reach of the federal power’; then, where the class of activities is
constitutionally regulated, ‘the courts have no power to excise, as
trivial, individual instances of the class.’171

Thus, the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits were wrong to
attempt to remove Corp, McCoy, Maxwell, and Smith from the reach of
the child pornography statutes because of the facts of their cases. The
exact nature of an individual’s activities is wholly irrelevant to
determining the constitutionality of those statutes.
Furthermore, as noted above, these circuits questioned the validity
of the jurisdictional element, but unlike the other circuits, they relied
heavily on the jurisdictional element’s weakness to find the statutes
unconstitutional. However, commentators have suggested that the
weakness or nonexistence of one of the Morrison factors is not only not
dispositive, it is almost irrelevant to the determination.172 The courts,
dependant on Lopez, took the materials-in-commerce hook very strongly,
and used this to strike down the statutes without proper attention to the
other factors.

169
United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1141 (9th Cir. 2003) (Trott, J.,
dissenting).
170
Stewart, supra note 161, at 186.
171
Id. at 183 (Internal citations omitted).
172
See Stewart, supra note 161 and accompanying text.

2006]

Raich and the Federal Child Pornography Statutes

643

Another critique of these courts was their failure to recognize the
potency of Wickard as precedent for the child pornography statutes. The
Sixth Circuit did not even mention Wickard in its analysis, preferring to
base its decision wholly on Lopez and Morrison.173 The other courts,
while they did mention Wickard, relegated it to an ineffective position,
dominated by more recent jurisprudence. For example, the Ninth Circuit,
in McCoy, found that “Wickard’s ‘aggregation principle’ does not
determine the question here. In both Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme
Court carefully limited the reach of Wickard . . .,”174 finding that while
Wickard had never been specifically overruled, the Rehnquist Court’s
intention was to dilute its status as precedent.
The Eleventh Circuit echoed this feeling in Maxwell and Smith,
holding that the child pornography statutes “can be sharply distinguished
from the activity the Supreme Court found subject to Commerce Clause
regulation in Wickard v. Filburn.”175 All three circuits rejected the idea
that Wickard’s broad reach was still good law in light of Lopez and
Morrison, despite the fact that Wickard had never been overruled. The
circuits chose to ignore a long-standing and persuasive argument in favor
of expansive Commerce Clause regulation, in some instances not even
mentioning the landmark decision.
The final critique of these cases is their creative manipulation of the
facts. The courts chose to highlight certain facts and ignore others so that
the statute seemed less appropriate in those cases. In Corp, the court
noted early in its decision that the photographs Corp had developed
contained shots of his seventeen-year-old lover and “another younger
female.”176 At the end of the decision however, the court claimed that
“Corp was not alleged to be a pedophile nor was he alleged to have been
illegally sexually involved with minors other than Sauntman, who was
merely months away from reaching majority.”177 In making this
assertion, the court conveniently overlooked that he photographed at
least one other minor child. This could lead a reasonable person to
assume that he had done such things before and to the presume that Corp
was in fact a pedophile or child pornographer.
Another strong example of this is James Maxwell, whom the
Eleventh Circuit found was beyond the reach of the child pornography
statutes because “it is difficult to imagine an activity more local in
character than Maxwell’s private possession of images within the
173
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confines of a single state (and perhaps, moreover, within a single
home).”178 In making this determination, the Eleventh Circuit
conveniently forgot that among the disks and pictures Maxwell
possessed, FBI witnesses identified some of the children as “minor
children, one from Florida and the other from Texas.”179 It is illogical of
the Eleventh Circuit to claim Maxwell’s activity was confined to one
home when he either took the photos himself or entered the national,
interstate market and purchased or traded for the photographs. Either
way, the government’s case certainly hinged on more than a claim of
Maxwell’s use of blank disks from out of state. Of all the defendants, his
activity appeared to be among the most obviously interstate. Maxwell
obtained pornographic pictures of children from out of state using some
forum of interstate commerce, and like the Sixth Circuit, the court
ignored this obvious use and found Maxwell’s activities wholly
intrastate.
III. RAICH AND OTHER RECENT COMMERCE CLAUSE DECISIONS
A. The Raich Decision
The Supreme Court has yet to review any of the circuit decisions on
the federal Child Pornography Statutes, leaving the circuits to decide for
themselves how best to apply those laws under the foggy guidance of
Wickard, Lopez, and Morrison. However, in the 2004-2005 Court Term,
the Court did revisit its Commerce Clause jurisprudence in Gonzales v.
Raich,180 a case regarding California’s Compassionate Use Act
(“CUA”)181 for medicinal marijuana and the federal government’s own
Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).182 The Court considered whether
the commerce power included the power “to prohibit the local cultivation
and use of marijuana in compliance with California law.”183 Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority, concluded that the CSA was
constitutional under the Commerce Clause and that it pre-empted
California’s law.
Justice Stevens began by explaining that the CUA was designed to
make medicinal marijuana available for “seriously ill” residents without
the fear of prosecution.184 The respondents, Raich and Monson, were
178
179
180
181
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183
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both California residents who used the CUA to obtain the marijuana they
needed for their respective illnesses.185 Raich and Monson brought suit
against the Attorney General and the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) after the DEA destroyed Monson’s supply of cannabis plants.186
The respondents claimed that the CSA violated the Commerce Clause,
the Due Process Clause, and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.187 The
district court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction, finding
that the respondents could not demonstrate the requisite “likelihood of
success on the merits of their legal claims.”188 The Ninth Circuit
reversed, finding that the “intrastate, noncommercial” use of medicinal
marijuana was outside the scope of the Commerce Clause.189 The Ninth
Circuit focused on the idea of a “separate and distinct class of activities,”
applying Lopez and Morrison to find that such limited use for medical
purposes was not a commercial activity.190 Justice Stevens then briefly
stated the holding that despite Lopez and Morrison, the CSA was a valid
federal law under the Commerce Clause, “even as applied to the
troubling facts of this case.”191
After discussing the extensive history of drug regulation, Justice
Stevens returned to the CSA.192 The Court examined the congressional
findings of the CSA, in particular the findings that local production and
possession of drugs affect interstate commerce and that controlled
substances are fungible products which cannot be differentiated between
local and interstate items.193 These findings are remarkably similar to the
ones used by many circuits to defend the child pornography statutes.
Finally, Justice Stevens explained that Congress classified marijuana as a
Schedule I drug, meaning it had a “high potential for abuse, lack of any
accepted medical use, and absence of any accepted safety for use in
medically supervised treatment.”194 In choosing to place marijuana in this
class, Congress signaled that it found no medicinal value in the drug and
mandated that all marijuana use (like all other Schedule I drugs) was
totally prohibited, except in an FDA research study.195 The Court also
noted that the CSA allows for the reclassification of all drugs and that
185
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despite several attempts by lobbyists, marijuana remained a Schedule I
drug, with all the restrictions.196
The Court then rejected each argument put forth by the
respondents, starting with the claim that the CSA’s prohibition of
intrastate manufacture and possession of medical marijuana exceeded the
constitutional limits of the Commerce Clause.197 Justice Stevens
explained how Wickard was of “particular relevance,” in that it granted
Congress the power to regulate an entire class of activity under the
aggregation theory, meaning that “[w]hen Congress decides that the
‘total incidence’ of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may
regulate the entire class.”198
The Court relied heavily on a comparison between the CSA and the
Agricultural Adjustment Act (“AAA”) in Wickard, giving two parallels.
First, the respondents, as in Wickard, were cultivating a fungible
commodity for personal, not commercial use.199 Justice Stevens clarified
that here, as in Wickard, “Congress had a rational basis for concluding
that leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would
affect price and market conditions.”200 The second comparison was that
both homegrown wheat during the Great Depression and homegrown
medicinal marijuana in today’s thriving drug market may be drawn into
the interstate market because of the huge demand for those products.201
Because of the strong similarities between the CSA and the AAA, and
between the products’ demand, Justice Stevens held that Wickard’s
aggregation theory controlled the Court’s analysis.
The Court also rejected the argument that, as in Lopez and
Morrison, the lack of particularized congressional findings rendered the
CSA unconstitutional. But Justice Stevens explained that “while
congressional findings are certainly helpful . . . ” their absence does not
per se make a statute unconstitutional.202 Justice Stevens explained that
requiring “a new and heightened burden on Congress” to include
expansive congressional findings would be “unprecedented” and
“impractical.”203
Finally the Court refused to “excise individual components of that
larger scheme,” of drug regulation, and would not grant the as-applied
challenge the respondents sought, relying once again on the rational196
197
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basis test.204 Using this test, Justice Stevens explained that because the
CSA specifically designated Schedule I drugs as having no medical uses,
the respondents could not argue that they were different from other drug
users.205 Furthermore, the Supremacy Clause precluded California from
circumventing federal laws banning marijuana simply by passing its own
law.206
The Court also had to distinguish Raich from Lopez and Morrison.
To begin, the Court explained that the respondents relied too heavily on
Lopez and Morrison, rather than “the larger context of modern-era
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”207 Justice Stevens then explained that
in both Lopez and Morrison the Court saw facial challenges to the
statutes, while the respondents here sought to overturn only a part of the
statute, adding that “[t]his distinction is pivotal.”208
To show how Raich differed from Lopez and Morrison, Justice
Stevens explored the economic activity involved in medicinal marijuana
use. The Court defined “economics” as “the production, distribution, and
consumption of commodities”209—an extremely broad definition that
would allow Congress to regulate nearly any activity involving any
product, and which did allow Congress here to regulate the intrastate
possession of medicinal marijuana.
Justice Stevens then addressed the contention that medicinal
marijuana was a totally distinct class that could be separated from
general drug use.210 Justice Stevens first explained that while Congress
could have chosen to exempt this class, it did not. Hence, the real issue
should be whether Congress’s decision was justified.211 Justice Stevens
explained that “[t]he notion that California law has surgically excised a
discrete activity that is hermetically sealed off from the larger interstate
marijuana market is a dubious proposition, and more importantly, one
that Congress could have rationally rejected.”212 Supported heavily by
the precedence of Wickard, Justice Stevens and the majority thus diluted
Lopez and Morrison in favor of a return to a more powerful Commerce
Clause, which could in turn lead to a more powerful and regulatory
central government. However, Justice Stevens suggested that
respondents should seek the reclassification of marijuana into a lower
204
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schedule, saying that “[u]nder the present state of the law” that the Court
had no option but to follow the Constitution.213
Given the controversy surrounding the issue, it is not surprising that
the Court failed to achieve unanimity. Justice Scalia concurred, to make
the valid point that the majority was “misleading” in that it was based
solely on the Commerce Clause.214 According to Justice Scalia, a more
accurate holding would have explained that the true power derived from
the Necessary and Proper Clause as well because category three, unlike
the other two, did not derive from interstate commerce itself.215
Justice Scalia also countered the dissenters’ claim that the majority
opinion would render Lopez a blip in the overall scheme of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.216 Justice Scalia wrote that even Lopez asserted
that intrastate activities could be regulated if the failure to do so could
hamper the overall attempt to regulate the market.217 The real difference
was that in neither Lopez nor Morrison did Congress attempt to regulate
“in connection with a more comprehensive scheme of regulation.”218
Ultimately, Justice Scalia explained how the Necessary and Proper
Clause, which requires that the means of regulation be “appropriate and
plainly adapted” to the ends sought, would limit the application of the
Commerce Clause.219 In the context of the CSA, since “it is impossible to
distinguish ‘controlled substances manufactured and distributed
intrastate’ from ‘controlled substances manufactured and distributed
interstate,’” it is appropriate for the government to regulate both.220
Based on this rationalization, Justice Scalia agreed with the majority’s
holding that the CSA was a valid exercise of congressional power under
both the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Justices O’Connor and Thomas wrote separate dissents.221 Justice
O’Connor’s dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, fervently disagreed with the majority and argued that the
majority decision invaded the sovereign sphere of states’ rights.222 In
Justice O’Connor’s view, the majority’s holding is “irreconcilable” with
both Lopez and Morrison223 and relegated Lopez to “nothing more than a
213
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drafting guide.”224 Under the majority’s newest shift, Congress is able to
wield an almost tyrannical power, allowed to “regulate intrastate activity
without check.”225 Justice O’Connor’s dissent also pointed out the flaws
of the majority’s approach. The critique focused mainly on how the
majority condoned Congress’s attempt to control medicinal marijuana
use “without any proof” of its connection to the larger market.226 By
doing this, Congress “stifles an express choice” of the states and imposed
its own will on them.227
To come to this conclusion, Justice O’Connor explained that the
holdings of Lopez and Morrison were “materially indistinguishable”
from Raich.228 Moreover, Justice O’Connor determined that the conduct
of cultivating and possessing medicinal marijuana was totally intrastate
and that upholding the CSA in this regard “is tantamount to removing
meaningful limits on the Commerce Clause.”229 Justice O’Connor
explained that “[e]ven if intrastate cultivation and possession of
marijuana for one’s own medicinal use can properly be characterized as
economic, and I question whether it can, it has not been shown that such
activity substantially affects interstate commerce.”230 Arguing that “there
is simply no evidence” that medicinal marijuana use could affect the
market in a similar manner to homegrown wheat during the Great
Depression, Justice O’Connor distinguished Wickard and claimed that
the majority placed too much importance on the existence of unspecific
congressional findings to uphold the CSA.231 Finally, Justice O’Connor
urged the majority to remember the federal system, which was designed
to protect the sovereignty of the states and to keep the federal
government from encroaching on local matters.232
Justice Thomas echoed many of Justice O’Connor’s concerns about
state sovereignty, writing that “the Court abandons any attempt to
enforce the Constitution’s limits on federal power.”233 Justice Thomas
would have held that the CSA was unconstitutional, concluding that
never before had commerce included “the mere possession of a good or
some purely personal activity that did not involve trade or exchange for
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value.”234 Justice Thomas also rebutted Justice Scalia’s contention that
the majority’s approach was consistent with the Necessary and Proper
Clause. He found instead that California’s internal controls on the
medicinal marijuana market would not affect the CSA.235 Moreover,
Justice Thomas held that “[e]nforcement of the CSA can continue as it
did prior to the Compassionate Use Act,” because California’s law would
not contradict the CSA but merely exclude an extremely minor subclass
whose personal drug use barely affected the larger market.236
Finally, Justice Thomas declared that the majority’s use of the
“substantial effects test” is easily manipulable, because “[t]o evade even
that modest restriction on federal power, the majority defines economic
activity in the broadest possible terms” and could just as easily redefine
the test at any time.237 Relying heavily on the theory of federalism and
state sovereignty, Justice Thomas strongly criticized the majority’s “rush
to embrace federal power” and urged the Court to allow the states to
make such decisions for themselves.238
Because Raich is the most recent Commerce Clause decision, it
presumably represents the Court’s current opinion on the range of power
that Congress may wield. However, it leaves many unanswered questions
in its wake. The majority’s opinion did not attempt to overrule or explain
Lopez or Morrison, yet it completely stripped both of them of their
influence. Moreover, the Raich Court did not even bother to apply the
Morrison factors in its decision to uphold the statute—in fact, the
majority did not even discuss the jurisdictional element at all.239 This
begs the question of what the lower courts are supposed to do with these
three decisions. As Justice O’Connor pointed out, these decisions do not
create a coherent rule for the courts to follow, but rather generate a
situation where the district courts are certainly going to disagree on
which precedent is more appropriate in a particular case.
Another question created by the Court is how to apply its definition
of “economics.” The Court used an extremely broad dictionary definition
that appears to encompass all possible products in any sort of
commerce.240 But merely describing economics as “production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities”241 does not give any sort
of guidelines for how courts should apply this. The Court also failed to
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241

Id. at 2230.
Id. at 2231-32.
Id.
Id. at 2236.
Id. at 2238-39.
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
Id. at 2211.
Id.

2006]

Raich and the Federal Child Pornography Statutes

651

point out the difference between intrastate and interstate economics and
seemed to suggest that in fact Congress can regulate either because to do
otherwise would cripple the government’s ability to regulate effectively.
Finally, the Court boldly stated that “when Congress decides that
the ‘total incidence’ of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it
may regulate the entire class.”242 This declaration appears to firmly
establish that “as-applied” challenges to federal statutes will not be
entertained by the Court, as if this was a settled point. However, every
circuit that struck down the child pornography statutes did so on an asapplied basis, thus it may not be as simple as the Court makes it out to
be. While “no Supreme Court decision has ever purported to carve a
singular litigant’s activity from an otherwise rationally and
constitutionally defined class,”243 it seems that all circuits will at least
entertain the idea of an as-applied challenge, and without the Court’s
clear guidance on this point, it is more than likely that circuit decisions
will continue to turn on this challenge.
B. Post-Raich Jurisprudence
In the wake of Raich, the Eleventh Circuit’s two child pornography
decisions, Smith and Maxwell went before the Supreme Court on
petitions for certiorari. On June 20, 2005, only two weeks after Raich
was announced, the Court granted certiorari on United States v. Smith,
and vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s decision.244 The Court, however, did
not hear the case. It simply remanded to the Eleventh Circuit “for further
consideration in light of Gonzales v. Raich.”245
At the start of the October 2005 term, the Court returned to
consider Maxwell and ordered the same remand to the Eleventh Circuit,
to again reconsider its position based on Raich.246
The Ninth Circuit has also been forced to reconsider its position on
the Production Statute in United States v. Tashbook.247 In that case, the
Ninth Circuit seemingly reversed its prior position, articulated in McCoy,
and upheld Tashbook’s conviction.248 However, the court did not
overrule McCoy; rather the Ninth Circuit merely distinguished Tashbook
from McCoy, finding that Tashbook’s de minimus activities were by
nature interstate because he advertised through the internet and used
242
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email and telephone conversations to lure victims.249 The court also
relied on the difference between the Production and Possession Statutes.
To the Ninth Circuit, the Production Statute was more related to
interstate commerce because it regulates production, not “mere”
possession as the Possession Statute does.250 Because the Ninth Circuit
specifically distinguished Tashbook from other Commerce Clause
challenges, the court astutely avoided the Raich issue, determining that
“we need not address any effect Raich may have on the current case.”251
Since the Court avoided the child pornography statutes in favor of
remanding them to the circuits to tackle, and because (at least) the Ninth
Circuit continues to allow as-applied challenges to the statutes it is
unclear what effect Raich will have on this circuit split. Raich, however
has already been cited in at least three new Supreme Court decisions,252
and thirteen lower court decisions.253
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUITS AFTER RAICH
A. Analysis of the Circuits that Upheld the Statutes
After the Court decided Raich, it is easy to assume that the circuits
upholding the child pornography statutes were correct—it would seem
that because the Raich decision recommends an expansive commerce
power that the Court would apply this principle to the Federal Child
Pornography Statutes. However, this is far from certain. One could argue
that the Court, in deciding Raich, legislated from the bench based on the
Justices’ personal beliefs regarding the medicinal purposes of marijuana
rather than their concern for Congress’s Commerce Power. This is a
powerful supposition, but it makes sense considering the Court’s drastic
reversal in Lopez was decided only ten years ago and there have been no
changes in the makeup of the Court during that time.
However, based on the Court’s decision in Raich, whatever its
motivation, certainly the circuit court decisions upholding the statutes
would be affirmed. Notably the Morrison Court referred to legislative
findings as a factor, but the Raich Court characterized them as merely
249
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“helpful” and further stated that “the absence of particularized findings”
would not damage a statute’s constitutionality.254 This helps the
constitutionality of the child pornography statutes because there is no
mention of how intrastate, homemade child pornography affects the
commercial interstate market, as several circuits pointed out.
There is one large criticism of upholding the child pornography
statutes as written: They could basically obliterate any remaining state
right to police such obvious criminal activity. Many commentators have
been critical of such usurpation, saying “the Founders ‘repeatedly
rejected unlimited national power and emphasized that the delegated
powers of the national government were specifically enumerated in the
Constitution,’ condemning a sweeping congressional police power that
they feared would lead again to tyranny.”255 The materials-in-commerce
jurisdictional element is, as the Rodia Court noted, “almost useless” and
does not seem to minimize in any way Congress’s Commerce Power.
When the Eleventh Circuit initially struck down the Possession
Statute, the court noted that “[t]he regulation of criminal activity in
particular has long been regarded as a role reserved primarily to the
states.”256 It is a relevant and appropriate concern to wonder if Congress
and the Supreme Court are commandeering power that was specifically
set aside by the Founders for the states and taking it for the federal
government. It seems not only wrong, but unconstitutional to allow such
an overwhelming disregard for the intentions of the Founding Fathers of
this country.
There is no way to tell at this time if the materials-in-commerce
jurisdictional hook and the other weak elements of the child pornography
statutes will join Wickard as a “high-water mark”257 of Commerce Clause
power. Perhaps they will help usher in a new wave of judicial deference
to more activities, even those that may have only at best an attenuated
link to interstate commerce. If Congress can regulate wholly intrastate,
homemade child pornography, then it seems likely that in time,
Congress’s power to regulate all such activities will be limitless.
B. Analysis of Circuits that Struck Down the Statutes
The Raich Court’s decision seems to be a return to the more
expansive commerce power that Congress enjoyed in the years before
254
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Lopez—the Court has granted Congress the sort of unbridled command in
that arena that it had from the New Deal through 1995. The Raich
decision also seems to suggest an end to as-applied challenges, even
when the facts are as “troubling”258 as those of illness-stricken medicinal
marijuana users, and the less troubling scenario of child pornographers
who produce or possess the pornography simply for their own benefit
and who do not enter the interstate market. Under the Court’s current
regime, it seems likely that Congress will not be stopped from regulating
all child pornography, and that the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit
decisions, viewed in this light, are incorrect.
Even before the Court clarified the commerce power in Raich, the
circuit courts that analyzed the child pornography statutes under the
Lopez and Morrison decisions seem to be correct. Those circuits
correctly applied the Morrison factors and just because they concluded
with a different result does not mean that Morrison was ignored. Rather,
the framers of the child pornography statutes simply learned how to
correctly write a jurisdictional element because of the guidance offered
by the Court. Those circuits also correctly saw that as-applied challenges
cannot be withstood and that the de minimus activities of an individual
defendant are not relevant in a constitutional analysis. In addition, those
circuits also recognized the continuing virility of Wickard as precedence.
The emergence of Lopez and Morrison did not change the importance of
Wickard in showing that Congress has broad regulatory powers under the
Commerce Clause, they simply clarified it. Now, after Raich, the
Supreme Court has shifted again, reverting to Wickard and to a strong
central government that has the ability to regulate all economic activities,
as defined by the Court. It is unlikely that the Court would strike down
these acts in the near future, although with the recent change of the
Court’s composition, nothing is certain.
C. Are the Child Pornography Statutes Constitutional?
The final question to ask is, of course, are these statutes
constitutional? In this post-Raich era, the child pornography statutes
almost certainly are. Because Congress can once again write broad
legislation based in the Commerce Clause, it is likely that these statutes
would be upheld if challenged. Moreover, an analysis of the statutes
leads to this conclusion. The statutes are supported by decades of
congressional findings, have a (somewhat weak) jurisdictional hook, and
under Raich, even wholly intrastate activities can be regulated if they
could affect the government’s ability to effectively regulate the activity
258
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as a whole. Because of the aggregation theory that Raich reaffirmed,
wholly intrastate and noncommercial child pornography would fit under
the Court’s broad definition of an economic activity. Even though the
statutes raise interesting issues and questions, such as whether the
jurisdictional element has any true value, under current Commerce
Clause jurisprudence the federal child pornography statutes are
constitutional.
V. THE FUTURE OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ACTS
A. Government Support for the Acts
The federal government and governmental agencies have
overwhelmingly shown their support for federal power over child
pornography. The child pornography industry has entered the
technological revolution of the Internet and sparked a new interest in
controlling this national problem, because it is so much easier now to
gain access to these things. Several of the circuit cases above included a
computer or Internet element, including United States v. Buculei,259
United States v. Angle,260 and United States v. Maxwell.261 Additionally,
both statutes’ jurisdictional elements now include transportation over
state lines through the use of a computer, a feature that was added in the
1998 amendments.262
In October 2002, President Bush gave a speech on Internet safety
and child pornography in an attempt to persuade the Senate to approve
the House-approved Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act,
which makes computer-generated images of children in obscene
situations illegal.263 The accompanying fact sheet from the White House
Press Secretary included the statistic that “[f]ederal prosecutions for
child exploitation and child pornography. . .are projected to increase 17%
for [Fiscal Year] 2002 [sic] a 22% increase in the past two Fiscal
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Years.”264 This statistic suggests either that the Internet has caused an
increase in child pornography because it makes that pornography more
accessible or that the Internet has caused an increase in prosecutions
because it is much easier to track pornographers online than it is through
traditional methods, or perhaps both.
No matter what, the advent of Internet-based child pornography has
increased the attention on child pornography and made these statutes
much more controversial. The ability of the government to track child
pornographers is a relief to parents wanting to protect their children, but
in the same sense it is terrifying to the average individual who wants the
government to be a laissez-faire presence in their life, not monitoring the
routine movements of citizens simply because it can or wants to.
The United States Post Office (“USPS”) has also become involved
in the pursuit of child pornographers, and the USPS reported that “[s]ince
the passage of the Child Protection Act of 1984, Postal Inspectors have
conducted 4,474 child exploitation investigations, resulting in the arrests
of 3,711 individuals who used the mail in violation of federal child
exploitation laws.”265 This report certainly bolsters support for the
statutes, because it shows how flagrant some pornographers can be in
boldly sending child pornography through the mail but also leaves open
the question of how the USPS decides how to track such pornography
and under what circumstances can the USPS open private mail because
of some suspicion of wrongdoing.
The information coming from the Executive Branch and the USPS
suggest that the government is more focused than ever on catching child
pornographers. While this is an admirable quest, it always seems to lead
back to the concerns over federalism and tyranny. If the federal
government can regulate an activity that does seem to be wholly
intrastate, where is the logical stopping point and what keeps the
government from continuing to take more and more, until there is
nothing left?
B. Future of the Acts and the Commerce Clause
Since the Supreme Court has recently announced its preference for
a strong commerce power in Raich, it seems likely that if the federal
Child Pornography Acts were to come before the Court, they would be
264
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upheld. It was only ten years ago that Lopez sent a “shockwave that
swept through both the legal profession and academy”266 when it broke
from decades of precedence to strike down the Gun-Free School Zone
Act. Between these two decisions there was no change on the Court, as
Justice Breyer was the last appointee in 1994.267
However, the political climate has drastically changed. America
experienced an act of terrorism on September 11, 2001 which strongly
affected Americans and our dependency on a strong government and the
country has become engaged in a new war, which also threatens the lives
of Americans. These fears, while not in any way related to child
pornography, create a need or desire for strength from the government,
and the Supreme Court probably is deferring to Congress’s wisdom in
the same way it felt necessary to do so during the Great Depression and
the New Deal. Rather than impede the government’s objectives, the
Court might be giving Congress broad powers to do whatever is
necessary in the light of terrorism and other worldly fears. Yet there is no
way to be certain of any of this, especially with the death of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the retirement of Justice O’Connor, and the appointment of
two new Justices. There is no telling how the newest Justices will regard
the Commerce Clause or the Raich decision. Ultimately, only time will
tell about the future of these Acts.
C. The Slippery Slope Problem
There is always the fear that each time the Supreme Court defines
the limit of the Commerce Clause that Congress will take that limit and
push it further. Michael Heimbach, chief of the FBI’s Crimes Against
Children Unit, announced in 2002 the FBI’s intention to help Congress
“broaden our jurisdiction to prosecute Americans who go abroad to have
sex with children or pay minors for sex.”268 Heimbach also announced
the plans to prosecute “sex tourists,” allowing the federal government to
“prosecute American who go abroad and engage in statutory rape of
children, without having to show the person intended the act before
leaving the United States.”269
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At first it seems that the ability to prosecute such child sex
offenders is a natural offshoot of the ability to prosecute child
pornographers because both involve the serious issue of child
exploitation, but in reality there is a huge leap from one to the other.
Mainly, intrastate child pornography occurs in the United States, while
obviously, the foreign child sex trade occurs outside the United States. If
Congress were given the power to prosecute crimes that occur wholly
outside its own borders, there could be no natural stopping point for any
crimes, even if they are wholly intrastate or wholly foreign activities.
Because Congress has been given so much leeway to legislate via the
Commerce Clause, there are valid and reasonable fears that Congress is
becoming the tyrant the Founders feared when they carefully drafted the
Constitution.
Based on the Supreme Court’s newest decision there really is no
limit on Congress’s ability to legislate under the Commerce Clause,
because as defined, an economic activity is one that involves “the
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.”270 There can
hardly be imagined a more broadly construed definition and there is
hardly any product or activity that does not have something to do with
producing, distributing, or consuming a commodity. Without the
valuable check provided by the Judiciary, Congress will continue to
expand its jurisdiction over areas that are traditionally and
constitutionally reserved for the states.
Unfortunately for the Judiciary and defendants, the Raich decision
reiterated the belief that as-applied challenges to Commerce Clause
statutes cannot be entertained, leaving the courts only facial challenges,
which are “the most difficult challenge[s] to mount successfully.”271
With only this one particularly difficult challenge to statutes, presumably
the courts are going to be more hesitant to strike down whole statutes and
will defer more to the will of Congress, leaving Congress to stretch and
manipulate the reach of the Commerce Clause unchecked.
CONCLUSION
The circuits that have upheld the child pornography statutes had a
valid basis for their decisions. The supply and demand argument for
child pornography and the aggregation theory are compelling concerns.
Perhaps it is true that homemade pornography causes an intrastate
pornographer to reach out beyond the borders of his state for a larger
270
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variety, and under Wickard, the de minimus activities of a single child
pornographer may not even be relevant. Furthermore, the states do not
seem to have a handle on this problem and the Internet only exacerbates
the issue. The child pornography market looks like it is growing, not
diminishing. National control and regulation can help the problem and
stem the tide of child pornography.
Finally there are legitimate ties from child pornography to
commerce. Child pornography certainly is an industry that is wildly
popular among a particular subculture. Moreover, it is a commercial
activity as defined in Raich, even if it is not necessarily the same as the
wheat market. The federal government had a rational basis in concluding
that it needs to regulate child pornography and the circuits that upheld
the statute were simply following precedent. “The realities of today’s
global society make it not only implausible but also normatively
unacceptable to credit Roscoe Filburn’s complaint that federal regulation
invaded an exclusively local, even private, sphere of control.”272 In this
modern world of Internet, wireless communications and instant access to
everything, there is a strong need for a government that is able to combat
these problems.
However, does this mean that the government should have
unbridled power over every economic activity, no matter how attenuated
the link is to interstate commerce? The Raich decision does to Lopez and
Morrison what they did to Wickard. If the Supreme Court simply turns
away from these concerns and completely defers to the will of Congress,
not only is the Commerce Clause potentially stretched beyond its
constitutional limit, but the Court’s own power to check Congress is put
at risk. Even if the Court and United States citizens do legitimately have
fears about the ability of the federal government to protect us and our
children, at some point the government crosses the line from protector to
dictator.
Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Raich explained that there must be a
point at which Congress has to respect the sovereignty of the states and
recognize that some things truly belong in the realm of state police
power. In between regulating everything and regulating nothing, there is
a middle ground in which Congress could regulate only those things that
substantially relate to interstate commerce so that the constitutional
bounds of federalism are protected and the balance of power does not
shift too far.

272

See Chen, supra note 162, at 1757.

